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THE POWER WITHIN
REPRESENTATIVE TOM MOORE*
PART ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INNERWORKINGS OF THE
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE AND A GLANCE AT CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION To IMPROVE THE PROCESS
Article III of the Florida Constitution establishes the basic frame-
work for the exercise of legislative power in Florida. With the con-
vening of Florida's Constitution Revision Commission in 1977, the
entire Legislative Article became open to reexamination.' Elsewhere
in this symposium there is considerable discussion of citizen initiative
to enact statutory laws. Certainly, movement to a unicameral legisla-
ture2 or to single member legislative districts3 would significantly affect
the legislative process in Florida. Similarly, a constitutional right of
citizen initiative and referendum to promulgate statutory law, enacted
in Florida, would open vast new possibilities for citizens to influence
the legislature. 4 While this article does not encompass those discus-
* Member, Florida House of Representatives, elected 1974. B.S., B.A., University of
Florida, 1963; J.D., University of Florida, 1966.
1. This two-part article discusses legislative power in Florida's state government and
proposals to improve Florida's legislative process. The first part explains the present
power functions of various legislative leadership posts and summarizes existing checks
and balances on the exercise of power by legislative leaders. Following is an analysis of
the potential impact of specific changes suggested by reformers as part of the package
on which Florida citizens might vote in November, 1978, through constitutional revision.
In a forthcoming issue of the Florida State University Law Review, the second part of
this article will discuss proposals for reform of legislative procedural rules.
2. See D'Alemberte & Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 355
(1965).
3. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977). See also Banzhaf, One Man, ? Votes:
Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective Representation, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 808 (1968); Jewell, Local Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and
Judicial Choices, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 790 (1968); Effective Representation and Multi-
member Districts, 68 Mien. L. REv. 1577 (1970).
The Constitution Revision Commission voted on November 15, 1977, to support amend-
ment of Article III to mandate single-member legislative districts for both house and
senate. The author observed the proceedings and found the debate to be of the highest
caliber. The Commission rejected a proposal which provided for single-member house
districts but multi-member senate districts. It also rejected a proposal which would have
constitutionally mandated that boundaries of senate districts be coterminous with
boundaries of house districts. Thus, under the proposal as approved, a house district-
though smaller than a senate district-might not lie entirely within a single senate district.
The number one recommendation of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures
on how Florida could improve its legislature was: "Legislative districts in both houses
should be single-member." CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATtRES, THE SOMETIME
GOVERNMENTS 195 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS].
4. Note, Initiative and Referendum: Do They Impair or Encourage Better State
Gov't? 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 925 (1977). See also Diamond, California's Political Re-
form Act: Greater Access to the Initiative Process, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 453 (1975).
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sions, it is related to them. For example, those who urge checks and
balances on the exercise of power by presiding officers of a two-chamber
legislature would likely intensify their cries for such checks and
balances on a single presiding officer if Florida moved to a unicameral
system.
I. TH NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The Florida Legislature ranks as one of the best state legislatures
in the nation. In fact, as of mid-1970, according to a study of the fifty
American legislatures published by the Citizens Conference on State
Legislatures, the Florida Legislature was fourth best overall. 5 Florida
ranked high in four of five rating categories, scoring first in the
"Independent" category, fourth in the "Informed" category, fifth in
the "Functional" category, and eighth in the "Accountable" category."
The study also highlighted the area in which Florida's legislature most
needs reform: in the "Representative" category, Florida's legislature
ranked a lowly thirtieth. 7
It is not unrealistic for the Florida Legislature to work toward
and achieve status as the best state legislature in the country.8 To do
so, however, Florida must substantially improve upon the "representa-
tiveness" of its legislature by diffusing the highly concentrated power
of its presiding officers.9
It is easy to observe the chaos of the legislative process in Florida
on public television every evening during the legislative session. Most
observers are shocked at the apparent lack of attention legislators,
particularly in the house, give to their colleagues during floor debate.
So much happens so quickly, especially in the closing days of a regular
session, that it is not unfair to characterize the event as a "circus."
5. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures carried out a major study of the 50
state legislatures as they were in mid-1970. The Florida Legislature ranked fourth overall
among the 50 states, behind California, New York, and Illinois. The overall ranking
was a consolidation of the states' rankings in five categories: functional, accountable, in-
formed, independent, and representative. For an analysis of the meaning of each of
the five categories and how the various state legislatures were ranked, see THE SOME-
TIME GOVERNMENTS, s.upra note 3.
6. Id. at 52.
7. Id.
8. The author did some of the research and writing for this article while in Denver,
Colorado, at the offices of Legis 50 (formerly the Citizens Conference on State Legisla-
tures). Larry Margolis, Executive Director of Legis 50, used roughly the words of the
text in response to the author's question about the potential of Florida's legislature to
become the best in the country.
9. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures measured both "individual effective-
ness" of state legislators and "diffusion and constraints on leadership" in the legislatures
in evaluating the "Representativeness" and "Accountability" categories. THE SOMETIME
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 3, at 43-47, 139.
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During the short, two-month session each year, ° members are under
tremendous pressure to pass legislation without knowing its full
content or potential impact. Every first-term legislator quickly learns
that the less said in explaining a bill, the better its chance of
passage." Surely this is unfortunate and worth correcting.
The Florida Legislature has sought to meet the inevitable logjam
at the close of each regular session in several ways,' 2 but increasing
concentration of power in the leadership has been the most significant
remedy. The result is that the power of a very small number of in-
dividual legislators-primarily the two presiding officers-makes most
things happen or not happen in the closing days. There is reason to
believe Florida would rank even lower in "Representativeness" today
than it did in the mid-1970's.'3
10. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(d) provides that the regular session "shall not exceed
sixty consecutive days."
11. One first-term house member wrote this response to the author after reviewing
the text statement in draft form: "How true! . . . as a freshman, I found the 'old-timers'
absolutely reveled in their ability to 'slip one by' and gain passage of a bill which
benefited only a chosen few." While first-termers are quick to learn this fact of life
about the legislative process, those who have been members the longest seem to be the
best at it. See, e.g., Miami Herald, July 10, 1977, § E, at 4, col. 1, describing how legisla-
tors, wary of the ways of the Chair of the House Rules and Calendar Committee,
scrutinized his last-minute bill line-by-line, looking for some catch, some grabber they
felt was surely hidden in it. The chair assured them that it was "no big deal," but the
grabber was discovered two weeks after the bill, the last enacted by the 1977 legislature,
was passed. The Herald characterized the legislation as the product of a veteran of the
process, "known for his subtle ability to slip bills of questionable origin-frequently
benefiting a special interest-into law .... " The point was: if lawmakers had known
more precisely what the bill did, objections to it would have possibly prevented its
enactment.
12. The use of "special orders" became a helpful tool at least as early as 1929
in the Florida House. See FLA. H.R. RULE 45 (1929) (available in the office of the
clerk of the Florida House of Representatives). Over the years, categories of bills of
a relatively noncommercial nature could be placed on such "special orders" and enacted
speedily. These included such items as "local bills" and "road designation bills." Present
FLA. H.R. RULE 8.17 allows the Committee on Rules and Calendar to "submit a Consent
Calendar to expedite the Calendar." Similarly, present FLA. H.R. RULE 8.18 does the
same thing for "Bills of a Local Nature."
Another approach to handling the logjam has been the use of presession committee
meetings. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures noted that "Florida's presession
activities could serve as a model which most other states would do well to adopt." THE
SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS, supra note 3, at 194.
13. Historical evidence of a steady process of increasing concentration of power in
Florida's legislative leadership can be found in the published procedural rules of the
Florida House of Representatives. A study of the earliest set of rules published in 1907
through the present rules reveals the movement toward concentration of power.
This trend is examined in some detail with specific reference to the calendaring
process at text accompanying notes 39-43, and in Moore, The Special Order Calendar in
Historical Perspective (1975) (available from the author on request).
See, e.g., St. Petersburg Times, June 12, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 1:
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Most Florida legislators, as well as many of their constituents,
believe in "strong" presiding officers. But continuing erosion of the
political strength of each individual member of the Florida Legislature
who holds no formal position of power fosters an increasingly undemo-
cratic process. 14 Budgets and legislative proposals will continue to in-
crease; however, the historical simultaneous trend toward further con-
centration of power in the legislature need not continue. If it does,
the legislative product in any given biennium will continue to reflect
the philosophy of the legislative leadership, not the entire body. Further,
that leadership will have been selected long before the biennium in
which they serve as officers. 1- The trend should be the other way. The
legislative product should be more representative of the collective
political philosophy of the membership.18
Barely six years ago Florida had a progressive, reform-minded Legislature that was
rated fourth best in the nation. Today it has a Legislature that is:
Beholden to the special interests;
Obsessed with raw political power;
Destitute of any programmatic leadership or commitment
And driven by ego.
14. There is no right to have one's legislative representative treated "fairly" within
the legislative halls, in terms of his influence over the process. Article IV, § 4 of the
United States Constitution states that "It]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a republican form of government .... ." In Luther v. Borden, 42
U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), the Supreme Court held the guarantee in that clause unen-
forceable because it was a political matter:
For as the United States guarantee to each state a republican government, Congress
must necessarily . . . determine whether it is republican or not. And when the
senators and representatives of a state are admitted into the councils of the Union,
the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority.
Id. at 42.
An equal protection challenge to apportionment of voting districts was heard in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). But an equal protection claim that one is not fairly
represented because of the poor committee assignments of one's legislator in the power
structure of the state legislature stands little chance of success.
15. The power of the presiding officers is now so great and so influential that their
campaigns have become long, costly, and hotly contested. Yet they are determined well
in advance of the term in which the officers serve. For example, both of the Florida
legislative chambers completed their leadership battles for the 1979-80 biennium before
the 1977 session ended. Thus, persons who have not yet in 1977 decided whether to run
for the Florida Legislature in the 1978 election face predetermined legislative leadership
for the two-year term in which they will serve if they run and are elected. In a note to
the author, the speaker-designate for the 1979-80 biennium stated that he spent an
estimated $20,000.00 in his speakership quest, which he began in 1972. At least one
candidate for speaker of the 1981-82 biennium was already traveling the state in the
summer of 1977 seeking pledges of support from present majority house members. St.
Petersburg Times, October 11, 1977, § B, at 14, col. 5.
16. The offices of the clerk of the house and the secretary of the senate provided
the following statistics on election of new members to their respective chambers in the
general elections of the 1970's:
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Even the most ardent champion of the status quo can agree that
certain proposals for change would make the legislature operate more
smoothly. With that in mind, the next section briefly sets forth the
present power functions exercised by legislative leaders as background
to subsequent sections of this article analyzing proposed reforms.
II. POWER FUNCTIONS OF FLORIDA'S LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP POSTS
A. The Presiding Officers
The Florida Constitution provides that both houses of the Florida
Legislature biennially choose their legislative officers. Each chamber
must choose "a permanent presiding officer selected from its member-
ship, who shall be designated in the senate as President of the Senate,
and in the house as Speaker of the House of Representatives."' 1 7 Be-
cause of present legislative rules in both chambers, these permanent
presiding officers exercise vast powers over the legislative process and
over the other members of the legislature. The biennial replacement
of powerful leaders is preferable to perpetual domination of the legisla-
tive process by one individual. However, the resulting succession of
overly powerful presiding officers has led to calls for legislative re-
form.18
The presiding officer of each chamber determines the committee
assignments of each member of his respective chamber and selects all
Election Year New Representatives New Senators
1970 32 9
1972 48 16
1974 41 12
1976 31 6
Thus, the percentage of new members in the 120-member house ranged from 25%
to 40% with each election. In the 40-member senate, the percentage of new members
ranged from 15% to 40%. Ordinarily, only half of the senators face reelection each
general election since they have 4-year terms. In 1972, howevier, all senators stood for
reelection as part of the decennial reapportionment of the legislature.
17. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2.
18. WJXT-TV4 of Jacksonville perhaps said it most succinctly in an editorial
televised November 23 and 25, 1976. After briefly listing the powers of the presiding
officers, the editorial said: "That's too much power." As with most other editorial
comment, it concluded that lawmakers ought to reform the legislative process. See, e.g.,
St. Petersburg Times, June 5, 1977, § D, at 2, col. 2:
Essential to improving the lawmaking process is limiting the power of the House
Speaker and the Senate President, who now dictate all committee assignments,
chairmanships and control the calendars. They are not accountable in any way
to members. In fact, members are accountable to the leaders.
That irresponsible power system must be broken if Florida is going to build a
legislature that makes laws on their merits.
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committee chairs. 19 He may add to the number of members of any
committee at any time or remove any individual member from a com-
mittee at any time he chooses.2 0 He may also remove a committee chair-
man from his position, as well as from the committee, at any time and
for any reason. 21
Legislative employees are completely under the thumb of the pre-
siding officer, who may hire and dismiss each employee of the chamber
over which he presides.2 2 Individual legislators may not dictate the
fate of their own legislative staffs, so even committee chairs may lose
staff directors whom they strongly support. 23
The presiding officers also control the assignment of parking places,
office spaces, and seating arrangements within the chambers. 4 They
may delegate this decision-making power to another," but one whom
they especially favor or disfavor finds that such "little things" can be
used as indicia of power or lack of power. Obviously, some parking
spaces are more conveniently located than others. Some legislative
19. FLA. H.R. RULE 6.1 (1976); FLA. S. RULES 2.1, 2.20 (1976).
20. This is customary; there is no actual provision in the rules allowing or prohibit-
ing addition or subtraction from committee membership. Even this informal power is
subject to abuse, however. See, e.g., Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 12, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 3;
Miami Herald, Oct. 12, 1977, § B, at 7, col. 1; Florida Times Union, Oct. 13, 1977, § B,
at 1, col. I.
21. This power is also exercised by custom. When exercised, it causes more reaction
from both legislators and the press than most other actions of the leadership. Some
impressive examples of this exist in the recent history of the Florida Legislature. See
newspaper articles cited supra note 20.
22. For example, the applicable house rule provides that "the Speaker shall have
the right to dismiss any employee of the House and pay of such employee shall stop
on the day of dismissal." FLA. H.R. RULE 1.6 (1976). The senate rule provides that the
"President shall resolve disputes involving the competency or decorum of a Senate employee
or attache . . . and may terminate the services . . . for just cause." FLA. S. RULE 1.28
(1976).
23. In the summer of 1977 the president of the senate fired the staff director of an
important senate committee. The committee chair was quoted by the UPI as saying "I
had nothing to do with it. He was an excellent staff director." St. Petersburg Times,
July 13, 1977, § B, at 12, col. I. That staff director had served with his chair for
several years in the house before they both moved to the senate. Id.
This author's file includes a letter from a senator who said of this and another summer
1977 staff firing by the senate president: "The truth is that these staff members found
themselves caught in a crossfire, and made the mistake of not siding with the Senate
President or his close cronies." (Letter available from author on request.)
The result is that each aide or secretary of an individual legislator may serve his
legislator and his constituents, but his paycheck comes only if he has the continued
blessing of the presiding officer. This holds true for every legislative employee.
24. FLA. H.R. RULE 2.3 (1976); FLA. S. RULE 1.5 (1976).
25. Each presiding officer presently delegates this power to his "pro tempore." The
house rule states that the speaker holds the power of "general control" of the chamber,
specifically over "the corridors, passages and rooms assigned to the House." FLA. H.R.
RULE 4.1 (1976).
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offices are small; some are large. In the old capitol, some were practically
in a public passageway. Some are conveniently located; some are tucked
away in almost forgotten recesses. Some desks in the house chamber
have been traditionally prestigious. Some have been traditionally "dog-
house" locations. (In the Florida Senate, seats are by district number,
in an orderly and numerical pattern. Thus, there is no particular
status to seat location.) In any event, these matters do psychologically
shape legislators' perspectives of their own power and that of their
colleagues. 26 Certainly each individual legislator is reminded that he
owes his place, good or bad, to his presiding officer.
In addition to substantially influencing the role and pecking order
of most individual legislators through the exercise of the above powers,
the presiding officer of each chamber exercises great power over the
passage or failure of every legislative proposal. When a bill is filed, the
presiding officer refers it to one or more committees.2 7 A referral to
only one committee can speed its passage, while referral to three com-
mittees in the house or even four in the senate will make the going
tough and often kill the bill.28
The presiding officer's ability to control the flow of debate also in-
fluences passage or failure of a bill.2 9 By custom, in both chambers the
presiding officer asks each legislator "for what purpose" he rises prior
26. One senator described this in a letter to the author as going "beyond the mere
question of ego damage." His letter states his concern that an individual legislator's
constituents may effectively "lose their voice" in the legislative process "at least to the
extent that their legislator would normally participate .... ".(Letter available from
author on request.)
Another veteran legislator, long accustomed to roomy quarters, found himself out of
favor with his presiding officer and relegated to such cramped office facilities that he
opened an additional office outside the legislative office building at his own expense.
(Letter available from author on request.)
27. FLA. H.R. RULE 8.8 (1976); FLA. S. RULE 4.6 (1976).
28. One house member formalized in a letter to the author his comments on this
point as made in floor debate during the 1977 regular session: "Referral of a bill to
three different committees, under present rules, makes it impossible to compel each
committee to hear the bill before the sixty-day session expires." By house rule, a com-
mittee chair, upon request of a member, must set a time for consideration of a bill.
FLA. H.R. RULE 6.6 (1977). In effect, however, the period can run 21 days from the
date of referral to this committee. Id. For bills referred to the Appropriations Committee
or the Committee on Finance and Taxation, the period under the rule is even longer,
specifically, 37 calendar days from the date of referral. Id.
In 1974, the author, then uninitiated and naive about the process, watched a house-
passed environmental bill receive three committee references from the then-president
of the senate when the senate obtained the bills in its messages from the house. The
author was anxious to lobby for the bill since only two weeks remained in the session.
Holding the computer print-out of the bill's senate committee referrals, a veteran legisla-
tive observer commented to the author: "There goes that one for another year." The
author had learned another lesson about legislative power.
29. FLA. H.R. RuLE 12 (1976); FLA. S. RULE 1.3 (1976).
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to giving that legislator the floor. If the presiding officer does not wish
to have the particular amendment or motion discussed at that point,
he simply responds to the legislator seeking recognition: "I won't
recognize you for that purpose at this time." While this procedure
enables the presiding officer to keep the members on the same subject
and bring order to the proceedings, it also frequently allows a vote
to be taken on an important subject before some individual members
can move their amendments to it? ° Obviously, by recognizing those
members who wish to present amendments he favors and failing to
recognize others, the presiding officer can significantly affect the final
product resulting from the amendatory process on the floor. Once he
recognizes a member who moves to terminate the amendatory process,
and a majority supports the motion, those who had additional pro-
posed amendments find themselves left to try again in the next session
or to look for another, similar bill to amend.3 1
In the house, the speaker also appoints a majority leader . 3  By
custom, the majority leader is the speaker's strong right arm. His posi-
tion is based upon his relationship to the presiding officer rather than
upon any grant of power from the members of the majority party. On
many issues, it is literally "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" from the
majority leader,3 3 who sends at least an occasional in-house report card
grading individual legislators to the presiding officer.3 4
30. This is particularly true in the house, where written amendments actually in the
possession of the clerk sometimes are never presented by their sponsors because the
majority has voted to terminate the amendatory process. FLA. H.R. RULE 10.14 (1976). If
a bill is being considered "section by section," then any amendments in the clerk's
possession must be considered, though debate is limited to three minutes per side on
each. If the bill is not being considered "section by section," which is the more usual
case, then any amendment other than one pending is cut off from consideration by the
House. FLA. H.R. RuLEz 10.14 (1976). See also FLA. S. RULEs 7.1, 7.2, 7.5 (1976).
31. One first-term member stated in a note to the author that the speaker may
never recognize a member's attempt to be heard "when the contribution to be made is
unknown" and might undo the speaker's plans. That is, he will not even ask "for what
purpose" the member rises. (Letter available from author upon request.)
32. There is no provision in the house rules for a majority leader, and he has no
formally delegated authority or responsibility. The power flows directly from the speaker
in whatever degree and to whatever extent the speaker determines. In the last two
years, many house Democrats have discussed election of the majority leader as possibly
preferable to the present appointment process. This discussion usually dies when further
debate turns to the question of a grant of power to the majority leader by the demo-
cratic caucus. At present, a "democratic caucus" hardly exists as an entity in the house.
It certainly does not exist politically as a policy-making body for a legislative program
supported generally by members of the majority party.
In the senate, a majority leader is elected if the president calls a caucus to elect one.
FLA. S. RULE 1.1 (1976).
33. The term refers to gestures members use during debate to indicate their posi-
tions on amendments.
34. A former staff member of the majority floor leader said in a note to the author
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B. President Pro Tempore and Speaker Pro Tempore
Like the senate president and speaker of the house, the president
pro tempore and speaker pro tempore are elected by members of
their respective chambers3 5 The power possessed by either officer at
any given time depends upon the willingness of his elected presiding
officer to give it to him. In both Florida legislative chambers in recent
years, the pro tempore candidates have run for their leadership posts in
tandem with a candidate for presiding officer, though it appears that
this was not always the case. 6 Thus, the majority of the majority party,
having elected this "team," may reasonably expect that the elected
presiding officer will delegate authority and responsibility to his "pro
tempore" running-mate. Nevertheless, without protection by rule, it has
been demonstrated recently that a presiding officer can strip even the
elected pro tempore of the authority and responsibility delegated to
him through committee assignments and a chair.3
In recent times, the "pro tempore" has been given authority and
responsibility for approving all funding requests from members
of his chamber for everything from legislative travel, stationery, and
district office expenses to typewriters and other everyday necessities.3,
Inherent in the power to approve an expenditure, obviously, is the
power to disapprove it.
C. The Chair of the Committee on Rules and Calendar
The second most powerful legislator in each chamber is the chair
of the Committee on Rules and Calendar. If he remains in the favor
of his elected presiding officer, this individual exercises substantial
control over the flow of legislation to the respective chamber floor. In
that he agreed with the statement in the text. Nevertheless, he would word it differently:
"The Majority Floor Leader has, in the past, advised the Speaker as to voting patterns
and records of members of the House on particular issues of importance to the House
leadership, in order to determine the atmosphere of the House to future legislative
proposals which may be pending." (Letter available from the author upon request.)
35. This election is pursuant to procedural rule, as opposed to election of the pre-
siding officers, which is constitutionally mandated. Compare FLA. H.R. RULE 1.1 (1976)
and FLA. S. RULE 1.1 (1976) with FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
36. Speaker Pro Tempore John Ryals stated in a note to the author that to his
knowledge he was the first candidate for speaker-pro-tempore-designate to run in tandem
with the candidate for speaker-designate. (Letter available from the author upon request.)
37. When the senate president realigned several senate committee chairs and com-
mittee assignments, the senate president pro tempore was among the casualties. The
senate president did not, and could not, remove the pro tempore from that elected posi-
tion but did remove him from assigned positions of power. See newspaper articles cited
supra note 20.
38. Both "pro tempores" in house and senate have had this responsibility in recent
times.
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both chambers, the "Special Order Calendar," a product of the Com-
mittee on Rules and Calendar, is the procedural device for effectuat-
ing this control.39
Procedures for placing bills on this calendar vary in the two
chambers. Under the applicable house rule, a majority of the member-
ship of the Committee on Rules and Calendar theoretically establishes
the list of bills on the special order calendar for any given legislative
day.40 In the senate, an alternating three-member panel from the
committee establishes the daily list. 4' As a practical matter, each in-
dividual member consults the rules chair, or asks a committee chair
or minority party leader to do so on his behalf, and requests the chair
to place the bill on the special order calendar. 42 In the house, if the
rules chair approves, the bill is brought up for consideration before
the full Rules and Calendar Committee, which normally accepts the
list presented to it by the chair. The bill then goes to the floor.
If the rules chair or the senate three-member panel is not inclined
to place the bill on the Special Order Calendar, the individual sponsor
of the bill has an uphill fight. Support from the committee chair of
the substantive committee which reported the bill favorably out of
committee becomes almost essential. If the chair of the substantive
committee opposes the bill, it would have to be widely popular to make
it past the objections of both the rules chair and the chair of the sub-
stantive committee.
The chair of the Committee on Rules and Calendar also deter-
mines the order of the bills on the list designated as the Special Order
Calendar. Thus, it is not unusual for a bill to be on the Special Order
Calendar for several legislative days. It may also nearly reach con-
sideration on one legislative day, only to be near the end of the list
the next day. In fact, there is no guarantee that it will even be on the
Special Order Calendar the next day.
43
39. In short, if a bill is even slightly controversial and fails to reach the "Special
Order Calendar." it is virtually dead.
For an analysis of the evolution of present rules pertaining to the special order
calendar, see Moore, The Special Order Calendar in Historical Perspective (1975) (avail-
able from the author upon request).
40. FLA. H.R. RuLE 8.15 (1976).
41. FLA. S. RuLE 4.17 (1976).
42. There is a printed form to accomplish this. A committee chair completes this
formal request for a particular bill, signs it and sends it to the chair of Rules and
Calendar.
43. This was not always the case. For example, the 1949 House Rules provided the
first historical insight into the evolving use of the "special order calendar" for bills other
than those of "great public importance." FLA. H.R. RuLE 6.20 (1949). In 1949, for the first
time, the rules specifically allowed a bill to move from the special order calendar on one
day, back to the regular calendar the next day, but this at least assured that the bill went
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D. Chairs of Substantive Committees
Because of the heavily concentrated power of the presiding officer
and the rules committee chair, the chairs of the various substantive
committees in the Florida Legislature are not as powerful as their
counterparts in the United States Congress. Nevertheless, they do hold
considerable power vis-a-vis individual members of the legislature who
hold no formal positions of power.
Among the substantive committee chairs in both chambers, the two
most powerful in each chamber are the chairs of the Appropriations
Committee and the Committee on Finance and Taxation. In recent
times, each presiding officer has referred an increasingly larger per-
centage of bills to one or both of these two committees." They have
become "super committees," which often rehash substantive matters
on controversial bills which have been thoroughly debated in public
hearings before other committees.45
The power of a committee chair includes the ability to agenda or
fail to agenda any bill referred to his committee for consideration.
Often timing itself is critical. A committee chair can kill a contro-
"to the head of the regular calendar." Today, such a bill simply goes back to the
regular calendar, with no further special consideration of its previous "special" status.
FLA. H. RULE 8.15 (1976).
In the 1976 session the author had a mobile home bill which was listed for several
days on the Special Order Calendar and then removed with little chance of ever again
appearing there. See FLA. H.R. RULE 8.15 (1976). It ultimately became law, but only
because it was amended to another mobile home bill by Representative Chester Clem
at the request of the author. Act of Oct. 1, 1976, ch. 76-278, 1976 Fla. Laws 754.
44. In 1975, for example, there were 3,494 bills referred to house committees. Of
these, 1,153 went to the Appropriations Committee and 340 went to the Committee on
Finance and Taxation. Of the 1,153 referred to Appropriations, 824 were left in the
Committee upon adjournment. Of the 340 referred to the Committee on Finance and
Taxation, 192 died in committee upon adjournment. (Records in the Office of the Clerk
of the Florida House of Representatives.)
45. Representative Dennis McDonald, for example, fought almost daily to push his
widely popular phosphate severence tax proposal through the 1977 legislature. In a note
to the author about the multiple committee references and hearings to which his bill
was subjected, he explained that he saw little value in re-argument of the same facts
and testimony before each hearing. His bill ultimately passed in amended form during
the second special session in June, 1977. Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 77-406, 1977 Fla. Laws
1768.
Similarly, the author sponsored the Safe Drinking Water Act, ch. 77-337, 1977 Fla.
Laws 1453, and shepherded the bill through substantial discussion in the House Natural
Resources Committee and further substantive debate in the House Appropriations Com-
mittee. In fact, the Appropriations Committee had dealt with the funding of Florida's
drinking water program in the appropriations bill itself prior to the hearing on the
proposed Safe Drinking Water Act. The author viewed the additional hearing for what
it was: not a hearing on appropriations for implementing the drinking water program,
but a hearing to reexamine the substance of the proposed legislation and perhaps kill
it or amend it substantially.
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versial bill by taking it up when the opponents outnumber the pro-
ponents, or vice versa. Many bills receive no hearing at all; some reside
in the bosom of the same committee for the entire legislative session.
Often, this is due simply to the volume of bills, especially in the
Appropriations and Finance and Tax Committees. Nonetheless, the
percentage of bills leaving a committee favorably or unfavorably can
be a measure of the fairness of a committee chair.46
As previously discussed, the special order calendar is important in
determining whether a bill will be heard on the floor. A bill usually
will not be placed on the special order calendar if the chair of the
committee reporting it actively opposes it, since committee chairs tend
to collectively establish a policy of "you stay out of my bailiwick and
I'll stay out of yours."
On the floor, a committee chair obviously and properly has con-
siderable influence over legislation dealing with a subject within the
jurisdiction of his committee47 and can use his leadership position to
pass, amend, or kill such legislation. Particularly during the hectic
closing days of a legislative session, he can effectively work with the
speaker and the rules chair either to kill a bill or to promote its listing
on the Special Order Calendar for a speedy floor vote.
A bill passed in one chamber and sent to the other can be with-
drawn from committee in the second chamber upon motion of that
committee chair on the floor without a hearing in his committee. 48 If
a house committee chair, for example, withdraws a senate bill from his
committee shortly after it passes the senate and is referred to his com-
46. For example, in 1975, except for Appropriations and Finance & Taxation, all
but one of the committees reported on most of the bills referred to them. In the one
exception, only 40 of 144 bills were reported out of committee. (Records in the Office of
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.)
47. In the last week of the 1977 session, a certain senate bill within the subject area
jurisdiction of a house committee reached the house floor. The chair disliked and opposed
the bill. He almost killed it simply by volunteering to move the bill for the senate
sponsor, as a chair often does on bills from the other chamber within his subject area. He
offered four supposedly "friendly" amendments, any one of which, if adopted, would
have sent the bill back to the senate rather than immediately enrolling it for delivery
to the Governor. In such event, the bill likely would have died since it probably would
not have been considered again by both chambers before adjournment. But the chair's
opposition to the legislation was anticipated by some house members who "caught"
him trying to "help" the bill with his friendly amendments. The house rejected his
amendments and overwhelmingly passed the bill. The chair simply voted against the
bill. See the history of Senate Bill 1317, particularly action in the house on second reading
on June 1, 1977. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1038 (1977).
48. This is very common, especially with bills referred to the Committee on Appropria-
tions. Of the 1,153 bills referred to the House Appropriations Committee in 1975, only 90
were reported out of the committee. However, 239 were withdrawn from the committee
by motion of the chair in floor action; over 70%, then, died without a hearing. (Records
in the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives.)
THE POWER WITHIN
mittee, it is almost certain that the legislation will appear on the house
special order calendar within the next day or two. If the chair or the
house leadership opposed a senate-passed bill, the bill or its companion
would probably languish in the substantive committee until the session
ended.
E. Minority Party Leadership
In both chambers, members of the minority party elect a minority
leader.49 This leader, as well as other minority party members with
seniority and higher positions of influence, may exert considerable in-
fluence over the legislative process. For example, when an individual
member of either party is unable to get a bill on the floor via the special
order calendar because the chair of the committee which heard the
bill is opposed to it, a minority party leader may assist him in persuad-
ing the rules chair to bring the bill before the full rules committee.
Since minority party members are by custom excluded from committee
leadership, they are not subject to the pressure of staying out of a
committee chair's bailiwick. If the measure has some popular support,
a minority party member of the rules committee might well per-
suade both the rules chair and a majority of the members of the
committee to place the bill on the special order calendar, notwith-
standing the opposition of the particular chair. 50
The role of the minority party is also enhanced by numerous pro-
visions in the rules and the constitution which require a two-thirds
vote for certain action. 51 Even when the minority party does not have
enough members to constitute one-third of the chamber, it may find
support from enough of the majority party to prevent certain actions
and, at the least, to slow down the process.
III. EXISTING CHECKS AND BALANCES ON POWER
A. On the Presiding Officers
Nothing in the constitution, statutes, or legislative rules prohibits
a presiding officer from succeeding himself. In fact, there is no guaran-
tee that a presiding officer will not successfully maintain his position
49. This is formalized by rule in both chambers. FLA. H.R. RuLE 1.1 1976; FLA. S.
RuLE 1.1 (1976). Both rules call for election of the minority leader at a caucus of the
minority party.
50. Such a bill is discussed in note 45 supra. The House Minority Leader secured
placement of House Bill 2480, a mobile home bill, on the Special Order Calendar
at the request of the author, who was prime sponsor of the bill.
51. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(c) (requiring a two-thirds vote to override the
Governor's veto).
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for several terms through exercise of the power of his office. The Florida
Constitution limits the term of an officer to no more than four years
but does not prohibit reelection of an individual to another term in
the same office.52
Furthermore, there is no formal process for removal of the presid-
ing officer. Indeed, the constitution provides that he is a "permanent"
officer.5 3 Thus, arguably no statute or rule could establish a procedure
for removal of a president of the senate or speaker of the house
during his two-year term other than by removal from the legislature
itself.5 4 If the power of the leadership continues to increase as it has
in the past, it will become increasingly possible for a strong leader
to perpetuate his personal control of a chamber.
There is no check on the power of the presiding officer to appoint
to or remove members from committees or chairs. Likewise, there are
no checks on the power to fire and hire legislative employees. Though
the procedural rules in the house are silent as to the removal power
of the presiding officers, it is presumed to be inherent within the power
to appoint. The senate rules specifically state that committee chairs
"continue in office at the pleasure of the President."5s
The house rules limit the speaker's power to refer bills to a maxi-
mum of three committees.5 6 The president of the senate is not similarly
restricted. Because of time prohibitions, if a bill has three or more
references, it must receive active support from the leadership to have
chance of passage.
By rule, any house member has the right to "move for reference
to a different committee" from the one to which the speaker referred a
bill.57 Upon such a motion, a simple majority could change the
reference. It is virtually impossible, however, to make a timely motion
because it must be made "no later than the succeeding legislative day"
following the reference.58 At first glance, that seems fair, though within
a tight time-frame. But it is hardly possible, since another rule makes
clear that "introduction and reference" of bills is last on each day's
52. FLA. CONST. art III, § 13.
53. Id. § 2.
54. The general rule elsewhere is to the contrary: a presiding officer may be removed
by a majority vote of the legislative body. See In re Speakership, 25 P. 707 (Colo. 1891);
T. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice § 315.
The current rules manual of the United States House of Representatives includes
Jefferson's Manual and the historical note that "[t]he House of Representatives has never
removed a speaker .... " H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1975).
55. FLA. S. RuLE 2.20 (1976).
56. FLA. H.R. RuLE 8.8 (1976). The rule limits referral to Appropriations, Finance
and Taxation, and one other committee.
57. Id. at 8.9.
58. Id.
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order of business, while "motions relating to committee references" are
considered early in the day's schedule.59 By custom, bill references, con-
sidered a ministerial task, take place after members have left the
chambers. Thus, it is often well into the succeeding legislative day,
and after consideration of motions pertaining to bill references, that a
member or his staff has much chance of learning that a bill went to an
unfriendly committee, contrary to his expectations. At this point, only
a two-thirds vote can change the speaker's referral.6" Thus, it is evident
that the presiding officer's power to initially refer bills is significant.61
The presiding officer's power to control floor debate is also signifi-
cant. If a presiding officer in the Florida Legislature is to receive an
open challenge to his power, it is most likely to occur on the floor
during debate or other business of the chamber. 62 Numerous times
during any legislative session, a member will rise to a "point of order"
under the rules, the only way one member may interrupt another with-
out the consent of the member who has the floor." Once a point of
order is made, however, the presiding officer determines whether or
not the point is well taken. The integrity of the chair is considered so
important in such matters that, even though a majority of members
may believe the presiding officer erred in a ruling on a point of order,
the decision of the chair will be upheld if appealed.6 4
There is one critical area in which the present Florida Constitu-
tion plays a key role in floor action. Article III, section 4(c) provides
the right of any "five members present" to require "the vote of each
59. Id. at 8.2.
60. A simple majority vote will secure a different reference upon a timely motion.
But any tardy motion (i.e., made after the order of business of "[m]otions relating to
committee reference on the succeeding legislative day") would be out of order, and it
would take a waiver of the rules to obtain a different reference. FLA. H.R. RULE 8.9 (1976).
A "two-thirds vote of all the members present" is required to waive the rules. Id. at 15.2.
61. When the speaker has referred a bill to the Committee on Appropriations or
the Committee on Finance and Taxation, only a "two-thirds vote of the members
present" can change the reference, regardless of when the motion is made. FLA. H.R. RULE
8.9 (1976). Thus, the presiding officer's power to bury a bill in either of the two super-
committees-or both of them-is very difficult to prevent. Even if a bill had absolutely
no fiscal impact of any kind, a two-thirds vote would still be required to remove it from
either of those two committees after the speaker's referral.
62. If a presiding officer refuses to allow a motion which is properly before the
legislative body, other state courts have held that the legislators may at once appeal the
ruling of the chair, debate the question as they would any other question, and overrule the
chair's decision. State ex rel. Southey v. Lasher, 42 A. 636 (Conn. 1897). The same rule
applies to questioning the ruling of the presiding officer on a motion to adjourn. See
Pevey v. Aylward, 91 N.E. 315 (Mass. 1910); Chariton v. Holliday, 14 N.W. 775 (Iowa 1883).
63. FLA. H.R. RULE 12.3 (1976); FLA. S. RULE 2.46 (1976).
64. Allen Morris, respected and venerable clerk of the house, often repeats that "a
Speaker of the Florida House has never been overruled on an appeal to the full House
of any decision on a point of order."
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member voting on any question" to "be entered on the journal." If
five or more members felt a presiding officer had ruled incorrectly on an
expressed voice vote, they could force him to call for the vote again
to record the vote of each member. The constitutional requirement
would clearly support a writ of mandamus against a presiding officer
who failed to do so. 6
5
B. On Other Legislative Leaders
The major check on the exercise of power by those in other leader-
ship positions is the power of the presiding officer to remove each or
all from their leadership posts. Needless to say, there is little "balance"
of power between the presiding officer and any individual committee
chair or other legislative leader, and individual members have few, if
any, real levers to challenge legislative leaders in the exercise of their
power functions. Some procedural rules purport to provide safeguards
to individual members, but they are largely ineffectual. For example,
house rule 6.6 provides that an individual member may withdraw a
bill from committee on a point of order if it has not been acted upon
by the committee within twenty-one days of its reference thereto; how-
ever, "acted upon" includes reference to a subcommittee (by vote of
the committee) which generally catches all but seasoned veterans of
the process by surprise. 6 Another way for the chair to keep the bill
in his committee longer than the rule period is by motion to extend the
period of time for committee consideration of the bill. Before the spon-
sor is aware that his bill is affected (he may even be absent from the
chamber when the motion is made), the motion can be passed, and
the sponsor must start counting the days again. Lastly, if a member
successfully though unwisely invoked rule 6.6, he would encounter an
unwritten rule that his bill would never receive consideration for the
special order calendar.6 7
C. Through the Legislative Process in General
There are currently important constitutional restrictions on the
65. See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Bledsoe, 31 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1947). The precursor
of present art. III, § 4(c) was said to be mandatory in Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
12 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1943).
66. FLA. H.R. PRECEDENT No. 6.6(e) (1971), an adjudication by Speaker Richard A.
Pettigrew. FLA. H.R. JouR. 790 (1971). The "precedents" are published each year by
the Florida House of Representatives. They represent the presiding officer's interpretation
of a given rule.
67. This is understandable when one realizes the extent of a committee chair's
power to influence other chairs in the calendaring process. No specific challenges to
the "unwritten rule" are documented because members recognize a chair's power before
they have a problem with placement of their bills on a committee's agenda.
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legislative process which allow a minority of members of each chamber
to exercise checks on the process.
1. Constitutional Requirement for Reading of Bills on Separate
Days, Unless Waived. Article III, section 7, requires each bill to be
"read in each house on three separate days, unless this rule is waived
by two-thirds vote."6 Although a bill may pass by majority vote, a
minority in excess of one-third can slow down the process. The delay
is usually for one day; sometimes long enough to generate enough
opposition to kill it on the vote for final passage.
From 1975 through 1978, the house procedure included the "carry-
ing over" of bills from the second to third reading on the next legisla-
tive day, except during the last few days of the session.69 That essentially
meant that debate on amendments took place on one day and debate
on final passage on the succeeding day. Prior to the 1975 session, how-
ever, and still in the senate, waiver of the three readings mandated by
the provision was customary, so that the amendatory process and final
passage often occurred on the same day.
2. Reading Bills in Full. A one-third minority may constitutionally
require that any or every bill be read "in full" on any or every read-
ing." Presumably, such a minority would do so only under special cir-
cumstances; for example, to protest the overly speedy passage of a bill
which was not printed, to give members time to read it. The constitu-
tion does not limit this right to such narrow circumstances, however.
3. Waiving the Rules. The procedural rules themselves check the
legislative process. Often a motion to waive the rules is made. One-
third of the membership on their collective toes, however, can prevent
waiver of the rules on matters of concern to them.71 At critical
moments, even a ruling from the chair that two-thirds approval of
members carried by a voice vote on a motion to waive the rules may
be challenged if five members request a recorded vote. If it is important
enough to the one-third minority, this also can slow down the "legisla-
tive train" that may be rolling faster than a substantial number of
members wish.
IV. SUGGESTED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
When this article was begun, the author was not at all convinced
68. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7. First reading simply involves the initial referral to
committee. Second reading is for amendment on the floor by majority vote. Third reading
is the time to debate the bill on final passage, though amendments may be adopted by
two-thirds vote.
69. The speaker simply declared that he supported such a practice. There is usually
little objection if the speaker asks the house to waive the constitutional requirement.
70. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
71. Id.
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that constitutional revision was a proper mechanism for achieving legis-
lative reform. After all, there is considerable merit to the position
that constitutional restraints on the legislative branch are inferior to
traditional checks and balances among all three branches of govern-
ment. After study and analysis of various reform proposals, however,
this writer concluded that some proposals for reform through constitu-
tional revision would meet certain situations better than internal rules
reforms. Removal of certain existing constitutional restraints on the
legislative process seems advisable, while more effective restraints are
needed to deal with the end-of-the-session logjam and other problems
of the process.
As for restoration of power to individual legislators not in the
highest leadership positions, several proposals make sense. The author
supports both the election of presiding officers by a constitutionally
mandated secret ballot and the establishment of a clear a constitutional
right of individual legislators to vote to remove them from office. The
writer opposes any limitation on eligibility for reelection of a presiding
officer, though such a constitutional revision is an obvious alternative
to the other two proposals.
A. The Legislative Process
It is time to revisit some old proposals to improve the constitu-
tion's legislative article. The following sections consider suggestions for
constitutional reform which were proposed in the 1960's.
1. Passage of Bills. A revision considered by the current Constitu-
tion Revision Commission, and largely rejected, was a total rewrite
of article III, section 7. The present section includes, as previously
mentioned, constitutional requirements that bills be read on three
separate days and "in full." These constraints, though intended to
assure deliberation and a sound legislative product, fail to effectively
accomplish those lofty objectives. In fact, as presently worded, a strong
and obnoxious minority of one-third of these members present can
hamstring the process for no good reason, just as well as a strong and
obnoxious leadership can railroad bills through with two-thirds waivers.
Also, the first reading of a bill is now simply a bothersome ministerial
function which could be better handled in a publication process
authorized by the legislative rules.
A better approach is that of the Model State Constitution, promul-
gated by the National Municipal League in 1963. In that document,
the suggested constitutional language on passage of bills states: "No
bill shall become a law unless it has been printed and placed upon the
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desks of the members in final form at least three days prior to final
passage . "... 72
That language combats two of the greatest built-in evils of the
legislative system: (1) the legislators' lack of information on content
and impact of the "final form" of a bill before voting on final passage;
and (2) the legislative logjam at the end of each session. The latter
has members concerned about passage of their own hastily-drawn and
lengthy amendments, rather than the final form that other legislation
took while their heads were turned to their own top priority items.
The suggested provision mandates a time limitation to the amendatory
process for each individual bill and reservation of the last three days
of the session for voting bills up or down without amendment. Such a
provision would force legislators to transfer last-minute energy now
expended on the amendatory process to needed deliberation on the
merits of the large number of bills they must vote on. It is during the
last three days of a regular session that much of the harm from poorly
and hastily drawn legislation is done. Highly ambiguous phrases,
grammatically incorrect language, or even directly conflicting legisla-
tion make their way into the statutes because legislators are unable
to scrutinize bills in the last-minute amendatory process.
Perhaps the Model State Constitution is too inflexible. Even so,
the benefits probably outweigh the detriments. If an ambiguity entered
a proposed bill by amendment and was discovered on the last day of
the session prior to the vote on final passage, then at least a decision
could be made about whether or not the ambiguity was so harmful
as to require defeat of the legislation. 73 Secondly, flexibility can be pro-
vided. For example, a sentence could be added to the proposed language
requiring publication and notice "at least three days prior to final
passage": "Two-thirds of the membership of a house, by motion ap-
72. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. IV, § 4.15 (6th
ed. 1963).
On November 15, 1977, the Constitutional Revision Commission met and discussed,
among other things, the quoted language from the Model State Constitution. The author
noted that commissioners constructively observed that "placed upon the desks of the
members" was narrower than an alternative phrase such as "furnished to all members."
Also, "printed .. . in final form" was mentioned as less desirable than "published in
written final form." (There was some concern that "printed" might exclude "typing and
photocopying" which would likely be the manner of publishing and furnishing the bills
to members in the closing days.) The author agreed and incorporated these two sugges-
tions in the draft amendment in Appendix "A" at the conclusion of Part I of this article.
One commissioner also suggested changing "three days" to "two days."
The Commission's final list of proposed constitutional changes included amendment
of art. III, § 7 to provide that publication in the journal would meet the requirement
for first reading of a bill.
73. Presently, bills coming out of a conference committee (a joint house-senate com-
mittee on major legislation) cannot be amended on the floor. FLA. H.R. RULE 6.14 (1976).
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proved in a separate vote as to each specific bill, may shorten the three-
day period for any bill, but only during the last three days of a regular
session or during an extended or special session."
Publication and notice of the "final form" of each bill would still
be required; however, the legislature could meet those requirements
and still correct, for example, an ambiguity discovered on the last day
of the session in a bill pending on final passage that day. The printers
might need to add some workers the last week; but whether the
benefits outweigh the costs would be a value judgment to be made by
the legislature on each real or imagined last-minute emergency.
Further, the suggested flexibility is itself limited. A "separate vote
as to each specific bill" would prevent one blanket motion to shorten
the three-day period on all bills, and the last phrase of the proposal
assures a deliberative process during the first fifty-seven days of each
regular session. There is no good reason to rush bills through the mill
in the early days.
A rewrite of article III, section 7 might also include the following
revision regarding recorded votes: "The yeas and nays on final passage
and on any vote to shorten the three-day period shall be entered in the
journal." 74 This language would emphasize the critical nature of such
votes, assuring accountability and discouraging any sacrifice of the
guarantee of a deliberative process.
Such revision of article III, section 7 could assure greater scrutiny
of legislation by all citizens.7 5 Those persons on the outer fringes of
the process who nevertheless are substantially affected by a proposed
law would have a better chance to affect what the legislature is about
to do to them. The often-quoted statement, "No [person's] life, liberty
or property are safe while the Legislature is in session," 76 would become
less believable. "Compliments"-now too often heard in legislative
circles-to the effect that "ol' so-and-so really snuck one by everybody"
would be heard less frequently. The measure of a legislator's effective-
ness would depend not on his ability to keep quiet on potentially con-
troversial parts of his legislation, but on his ability to defend those very
parts in a forum of well-informed colleagues.
2. Committees. The Model State Constitution also contains the
following suggested constitutional provision on legislative committees:
74. This is a variation on the suggestion of the MODEL STATE CONsTrrrrTIoN, supra
note 72, art. IV, § 4.15. The comparable provision in the Florida Constitution requires
votes to be recorded in the journal only on final passage. FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 7.
75. The amendment proposed in this section appears in its entirety in Appendix A.
76. The Final Accounting in the Estate of A.B., 1 Tucker 247, 249 (N.Y. Surrogate's
Court 1866).
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Committees. The legislature may establish such committees as
it may deem necessary for the conduct of its business. When a com-
mittee to which a bill has been assigned has not reported on it,
one-third of all the members of the legislature shall have the power
to relieve it of further consideration. Adequate public notice of all
committee hearings, with a clear statement of all subjects to be con-
sidered at each hearing, shall be published in advance. 7
A comparable addition to Florida's constitution would accomplish
two goals: it would end use of the committee as a "cemetary" for legisla-
tion desired by a majority of the legislative membership,7 8 and it would
constitutionally mandate adequate publicity of committee hearings,
formalizing those principles of open government not constitutionally
guaranteed but already practiced in the Florida Legislature.
B. Presiding Officers: Selection, Removal and Reelectability
These topics are central to the power of Florida's presiding legisla-
tive officers. For example, the specific proposal for the selection process,
if adopted, would make the other two specific proposals less important.
Thus, each subsection here requires evaluation in light of any action
on the others.
1. The Selection Process; Secret Versus Open Ballot. During the
reelection battle for the speakership of the house in the winter of
1975-76, numerous newspaper editorials argued the merits or lack of
merit of election of the speaker by secret ballot. A democratic caucus
proposal from the previous legislature had called for a secret ballot.7 9
Opponents asserted that a secret ballot would violate the open-
government principles that had made Florida a leader in "sunshine"
laws.8 ° Ability to vote in secret contrary to a publicly stated position,
they argued, would undermine the integrity of the Legislature.
77. MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, art. IV, § 4.13.
78. If a majority of the committee wanted to kill a bill it could do so, but only
by taking it up rather than by letting it die through inaction.
79. In the winter of 1972-73, the Florida House of Representatives designated a
"select committee on House leadership" to make recommendations on procedures to
elect future house leaders. That committee, chaired by Representative Ralph Turlington,
filed a report with Speaker Terrell Sessums containing seven recommendations, one of
which provided that the election "be held by secret ballot." The report of this 11-member
select committee was adopted unanimously at the Democratic caucus on Thursday, April
12, 1973.
80. Representative John Forbes of Jacksonville led the fight for an open ballot in
the 1976 Democratic caucus. He had previously requested an opinion from the attorney
general on the application of Florida's Sunshine Law to the election procedures of a
Democratic caucus of the house of representatives. The attorney general noted the
adoption of the 1973 caucus rule of procedure, concluding: "Such rule, which was
adopted unanimously at the Democratic caucus on April 12, 1973, upon recommendation
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When considering such arguments, one must first examine the
rationale behind all sunshine laws. First and foremost is the principle
of "accountability." That is, open voting makes the individual casting
the vote accountable to others who are interested in his vote. The
most important follow-up question, however, is: "Accountable to
whom?" One's constituents? Or the legislative leadership itself? While
the answer is both, the difference between constituents and legislative
leadership is rather obvious. In the case of his constituents, "accounta-
bility" for his vote in the election of the speaker is quite some
time away. In the case of the leadership, accountability is immediate
and can be quite determinative of the lawmaker's future role in the
legislature. For example, at the time of the January 1976 speakership
election, individual legislators faced reelection ten months later. At
that time, constituents of individual legislators would have to evaluate
votes on literally thousands of other matters in addition to the vote for
speaker designate. The one vote on the speaker's race would probably be
lost in the passage of time and the volume of legislation. The only fact
likely to be recalled by constituents would be whether their legislator
voted for the winning or losing candidate. Further, since personal role
and influence in the legislature could well be determined by whether
the lawmaker was on the winning side, that in itself might influence
constituents against their legislator who unsuccessfully challenged the
victors in a leadership battle.
As soon as any "open" vote for the presiding officer is announced,
the "new leadership" is established. Many months prior to actual
assumption of formal title, "accountability" to the new leadership
immediately shifts power toward the winners. In the 1976 speaker's
race, newspaper accounts reported that each candidate claimed posses-
sion of pledges which, added together, resulted in a number greater
than the number of members entitled to vote.81 Apparently someone
was playing it more than one way with the candidates. Not surprisingly,
everyone wants to be with the winner.
Hard-nosed, hard-ball politics and raw intimidation seem much
more likely to influence a legislator's vote in an open ballot process
than in a secret one. If one believes at all in Machiavellian politics,
then one recognizes that "fear" is more likely than "love" to motivate
of the select committee on House leadership is entitled to a presumption of validity,
and should be followed until either repealed or amended by a majority vote of the caucus
members." Letter of November 17, 1975, from Attorney General Robert Shevin to
Representative John Forbes (available from the author upon request). The attorney
general declined to comment on the validity of the rule as it pertained to any statutes,
procedural rules of the house, or rules and regulations of the National Democratic
Party.
81. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 11, 1976, § B, at 15, col. 3.
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one's vote for a presiding officer."2 Yet with a secret balloting process, a
legislator could vote his conscience with less fear of recrimination. For
the same reason, a laborer ought not have a union boss looking over his
shoulder as he marks his ballot for president of the union and drops
it into the ballot box. Democracy rests in part on the right to elect
leaders in secret, without candidates or their lieutenants looking over
the shoulder of the voter.8 3
2. Removal. Perhaps change in the makeup of the legislature
every two years is a frequent enough opportunity to change the legisla-
tive leadership. In any event, under present constitutional language it
is possible that even gross abuses of power during a term would not
render a presiding officer subject to removal from office unless he was
removed from his membership in the legislature.
Since the term for these offices is only two years, there is certainly
some merit in simply waiting out the term to correct leadership
problems and in requiring more than a simple majority vote for re-
moval of a presiding officer during a term. True, removal ought not
come as the result of an act of political animosity over a trivial or
sudden event. It seems reasonable, however, that a simple majority
could decide there was a serious lack of confidence in a presiding officer
and oust him. It is the only effective way to make the presiding officer
accountable to those who elect him and whom he serves.
Such an amendment to article III would provide individual
members with a tool to check arbitrary and capricious use of power
by a presiding officer. Indeed, the existence of the provision would
discourage a presiding officer from taking any action in the first instance
that would greatly offend a substantial number of members. At the
same time, it is unlikely that it would result in weak officers, afraid to
move boldly. Despite the availability of removal from the speakership
by a simple majority, "[t]he [United States] House of Representatives
has never removed a Speaker .... .8s4 A proposed constitutional pro-
82. I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and loved, that men love at
their own free will, but fear at the will of the prince, and that a wise prince
must rely on what is in his power and not on what is in the power of others, and
he must only contrive to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained.
N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 63 (L. Ricci trans. 1950).
83. Questions arose during the January, 1976, House Democratic Caucus balloting
about whether the voting process was truly "secret." One of the tellers for the defeated
candidate estimated that only six to eight of the ballots for the successful candidate did
not have signatures or initials on them. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 15, 1976, §
B, at 1, col. 3.
Appendix B sets forth a proposed constitutional amendment which would add the
phrase "by secret ballot" to the existing language of art. III, § 2 governing selection
of the presiding officers.
84. H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1975).
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vision expressly authorizing removal of legislative leaders by majority
vote is set out in Appendix C.8 5
3. Reelectability. In its 1971 study, the Citizens Conference on
State Legislatures recommended use in Florida of a reelectable presid-
ing officer. 6 The obvious corollary, in light of Florida's already strong
legislative leaders, is that a reelectable presiding officer should not be
vested with all of the powers now possessed by Florida's leaders.
Thus, the choice here is between amendment of the Florida Con-
stitution to limit the number of consecutive terms that one individual
may serve as presiding officer or, alternatively, deconcentration of the
power of the presiding officer rendering less objectionable the possibility
of reelection as authorized by the present constitutional language.
The case against restricting the number of terms lies in the availa-
bility of other checks on power s7 and the desirability for maximum
flexibility within the legislative article. In addition to checks and
balances from outside the legislature, specific proposals for substantive
procedural rules reform (discussed in detail in Part II of this
article) pose considerable potential for realizing the second of the
above approaches.
There should be no fear of a presiding officer's eligibility for several
terms once the legislature itself both formalizes its inherent ability to
check potential abuse of power and distributes power more evenly.
The benefits of having a reelected leader seem clear in terms of con-
tinuity in the legislative process: more efficiency including a reduction
in the present, almost constant, upheaval due to maneuvering for a
favorable place within the next presiding officer's leadership. Accounta-
bility of the chosen leader to his colleagues would do much to eliminate
concern that the reelected presiding officer would be characterized by
his flare for retribution.
85. The Commission's initial list of proposed constitutional changes included amend-
ment of art. 1II, § 2 to "[clarify] that the presiding officer serves at the pleasure of each
house and can be removed before his term expires." FLA. CONST. REV. COMM'N, FIRST
DRAFT PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 1968 CONSTITUTION.
86. THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS, supra note 3, at 195. The Florida House followed
this by establishing its own Subcommittee on Speakership Succession which filed a report
in April, 1972, recommending that the speaker be allowed to stand for reelection for a
total of not more than two successive terms. The report fully analyzes "the case for
changing the limitation on the Speaker's tenure." It was forwarded to Representative
Murray H. Dubbin, then the chair of the Committee on Rules and Calendar, by cover
letter of April 7, 1972, from Representative Louis Wolfson, II, chair of the Subcommittee.
(Available from the author upon request.)
87. For example, an independent executive and judiciary, a free press, and an in-
formed electorate.
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C. Other Proposed Constitutional Changes
Obviously there are many other subjects under the general rubric
of legislative reform that can be approached through constitutional
revision. This part of this two-part article has concentrated on those
issues of individual power and procedure that deal with the inner
workings of the legislature as they relate to constitutional revision.
Other items not discussed here, if successfully included in constitu-
tional revision some future day, also could substantially affect the legis-
lative process. This symposium includes an analysis of various proposals
for citizen initiative and referendum.88 Recall of legislators as a process
established by the constitution deserves a comprehensive analysis.8 9
But these topics remain for others to pursue.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed revisions that are discussed both in this Part I and
the forthcoming Part II are for this writer the most important and
pertinent to the subject of legislative reform at this time. Whether the
future Florida Legislature will operate in a highly democratic, fair,
and efficient manner will depend largely on the people and the elected
members they send to Tallahassee. Legislators themselves will continue
to make or break whatever rules exist for the legislative process. This
is as it should be and cannot really be changed no matter how much
one might wish to do so. All that any citizen can do is share his
view, as the author has done here, on how to shape the forms most
conducive to a better democracy.
The Florida Legislature can be the best state legislature in the
nation. In the opinion of the author, the constitutional revisions of
the legislative article that can help achieve that goal include:
(1) Rewriting present article III, section 7 to better assure a de-
liberative and informed legislature, especially in the hectic closing
days of each legislative session. This revision should include the
elimination of existing requirements for three separate readings and
of the provision that one-third of a chamber's members could require
bills to be read in full. Appendix A contains a proposed revision which
would redirect legislative energy to the merits of the final form of
88. Note, Initiative and Referendum: Do They Impair or Encourage Better State
Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 925 (1977).
89. Currently, 12 states, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have a constitutional pro-
vision for recall of state officials. The Council of State Governments, THE BooK OF THE
STATES 170 (1974-75).
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bills, especially important during the end-of-the-session logjam. This
has been done in part by the current revision commission."°
(2) Amending article III, section 2 to assure greater independence
of individual lawmakers in selecting legislative presiding officers.
Appendix B is a proposal to add the words "by secret ballot" to the
constitutional language on selection of officers.
(3) Amending article III, section 2 to clearly establish accounta-
bility of a presiding officer to the members. Appendix C proposes the
addition of a sentence to that section to make clear that a permanent
presiding officer may be removed from office during his term. The re-
vision commission has approved this proposal and recommended it to
the voters.9 '
This writer concludes that both constitutional revision and reform
of legislative procedural rules are sound avenues for reaching a worthy
destination: a better legislative process for Florida. Procedural rules
reform will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the Florida State
University Law Review.
90. Proposal No. 7 by the Constitution Revision Commission provides that "publica-
tion in the journal shall satisfy the requirement of the first reading." See note 7,2 supra.
91. Proposal No. 207 by the Constitution Revision Commission provides that the
presiding officer of each house shall serve at the "pleasure" of its members. This differs
somewhat from the initial proposal, which was discussed in note 85 supra.
THE POWER WITHIN
Appendix A
PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 7 OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION RELATING TO PASSAGE OF BILLS
(Substantial rewording of section 7. See article III, section 7 for present text.)
Section 7. Passage of bills.-Any bill may originate in either house and after passage
in one may be amended in the other. No bill shall become a law unless it has been
published in written, final form and furnished to all members at least three days prior
to final passage and the majority of the membership of each house has assented to it.
During the last three days of any regular session or during any special or extended
session, two-thirds of the total membership of a house, by motion approved in a
separate vote as to each specific bill, may shorten the three day period for any bill. The
yeas and nays on final passage and on any vote to shorten the three day period shall
be entered in the journal. Each house shall provide for the publication of all acts. No
act shall become effective until published as provided by law.
Appendix B
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION RELATING TO CHOOSING OF LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS
Section 2. Members; officers.-Each house shall be the sole judge of the qualifications,
elections, and returns of its members, and shall biennially choose its officers, by secret
ballot, including a permanent presiding officer selected from its membership, who shall
be designated in the senate as the President of the Senate, and in the house as Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The senate shall designate a Secretary to serve at its
pleasure, and the house of representatives shall designate a Clerk to serve at its pleasure.
The legislature shall appoint an auditor to serve at its pleasure who shall audit public
records and perform related duties as prescribed by law or concurrent resolution.
Appendix C
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION RELATING TO REMOVAL OF LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS
Section 2. Members; officers.-Each house shall be the sole judge of the qualifications,
elections, and returns of its members, and shall biennially choose its officers, including a
permanent presiding officer selected from its membership, who shall be designated in
the senate as President of the Senate, and in the house as Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Such officers shall serve at the pleasure of the members of each house,
which may remove any of its officers upon a majority vote of its total membership. The
senate shall designate a Secretary to serve at its pleasure, and the house of representatives
shall designate a Clerk to serve at its pleasure. The legislature shall appoint an auditor
to serve at its pleasure who shall audit public records and perform related duties as
prescribed by law or concurrent resolution.
19771

